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EVIDENCE
IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S ONE WITNESS: PRESENT NEW YORK
LAW AND PROPOSED CHANGES
. that most senseless of all evidential rules, the rule
which forbids a party to impeach his own witness."t
Often in the course of a trial it becomes important for a party to impeach
the testimony of a hostile or adverse witness. If the witness is one of his own
"calling"' or one whom he has "adopted," 2 the party's attempt to negative
such testimony is prevented by the rule that one cannot impeach his own
witness. Generally stated, this rule prevents a litigant from attacking his
own witness through evidence tending to show: (1) his witness' bad repu-
tation for truth and veracity, (2) prior favorable statements inconsistent
with the injurious testimony given on the trial, or (3) the witness' interest,
bias, or corruption to establish a motive of the witness to testify against the
party calling him.3 This absolute prohibition has been roundly condemned
by both lawyers and judges for the past one hundred years ;4 yet to too large
a degree it continues as the law of New York.
Today a critical examination of the current New York rule is needed to
determine what changes, if any, should be made in the present law. This
article seeks to fill that need by answering the four main questions: (1)
tMorgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1936) 4 U. or CHI. L.
Rv. 247, 257.
IThe courts have frequently been presented with the problem of what constitutes
calling a witness so as to set in operation the prohibition against impeachment. A party
does not make a witness summoned under an ordinary subpoena "his own" until he
attempts to elicit from the witness an answer furnishing relevant evidence. Beebe
v. Tinker, 2 Root 160 (Conn. 1794); Booth v. State, 24 Ga. App. 275, 100 S. E. 723
(1919). A witness summoned under a subpoena duces tecum becomes the party's own
when he answers respecting the identity or execution of the document. Fine v. Moom-jian, 114 Conn. 226, 158 Atl. 241 (1932) ; Salt Springs Natl. Bank v. Fancher, 92 Hurt
327, 36 N. Y. Supp. 742 (1895). But simply calling, swearing and introducing the
witness does not set the rule against impeachment in operation. Fall Brook Coal Co. v.
Hewson, 158 N. Y. 150, 52 N. E. 1095 (1899). See also 3 WIGmOpE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1940) § 909; 6 WIGmORE, id. at § 1892; 2 FoRD, LAw OF EVIDENCE (1935) § 134.2The most familiar instance where a party is held to have "adopted" a witness is
where a witness is cross-examined as to matters not brought out on the direct exami-
nation. He then becomes the witness of the party conducting the cross examination and
cannot be impeached by him. Koslowski v. U. S. Steel Furniture Co., 169 App. Div.
76, 154 N. Y. Supp. 735 (4th Dep't 1915); In re Campbell's Will, 100 Vt. 395, 138 Ati.
725 (1927).3For the scope of the rule prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness, see generally
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 900-902; 2 FORD, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1935)
§ 129. See also Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witwss-New Developments (1936)
4 UNiv. OF CHI. L. REV. 69; Holtzoff, The New York Rule as to Impeachment by cr
Party of His Own Witnesses (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 715.4New York courts have questioned the validity of the rule against impeaching one's
own witness since Sanchez v. The People, 22 N. Y. 147 (1860). See also the judicial
dissatisfaction with the rule expressed in Becker v. Koch, 104 N. Y. 394, 402, 10 N. E.
701 (1887) ; People v. De Martini, 213 N. Y. 203, 212, 107 N. E. 501 (1914). An early
and especially brilliant attack on the logical inconsistencies, of the rule can be found in
4 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (Bowring's ed. 1827) 401.
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How did the rule against impeaching one's own witness first arise? (2)
What are the reasons behind it? (3) What has been the history of the prohi-
bition in New York? (4) In the light of reason and history, what action
should be taken? Should the rule be preserved, modified, or utterly de-
stroyed ?
ORIGIN OF THE RULE
Legal scholars do not seem to know with certainty where or why the rule
that one cannot impeach his own witness began. Three possible origins of
the rule are listed-each with its better known proponent.
The first school of thought-that supported by Dean Wigmore-believes
the rule has its roots in the old medieval trial by compurgation.5 In this
-early mode of trial a party established his plea of defense if a prescribed
number of compurgators swore in proper form that they believed he spoke
the truth.6 There were no witnesses in the modern sense of the word-only
"oath helpers" who were chosen from among the kinsmen and adherents of
each party. Since these persons were partisans, and since the party had an
unlimited range for the selection of those to "swear him off," it was incon-
ceivable that a party should be allowed to gainsay his own chosen witnesses.-
A second school of thought claims that the prohibition against impeaching
-one's own witness arose from the decisory oath under the Roman law,8
where the party who tendered oath became bound by the oath of his adver-
sary.
The third and most recent school finds the origin of the rule in the transi-
tion from the inquisitorial method of trial to an adversary system. This
theory, best expounded by Dean Ladd,9 explains that it was not until the jury
became judges of the evidence alone, apart from any personal knowledge of
the issue, that witnesses in the modern sense appeared. Until the concept of
a witness as the witness of a party emerged, there could be no rational basis
for a rule that a party was bound by his witness and that he could not impeach
him.' 0 In this way, Dean Ladd accounts for the absence of reported cases
53 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 897; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 598.6 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE (1869) 25; von Moschzisker, The Historic Origin, of
Trial by Jury (1921) 70 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1, 73, 159, at 82.
7For a complete discussion of the historical background of compurgation or wager
of law, see Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1921); see also Ladd,
Impeachment of One's Own Witnesses-New Developments (1936) 4 UNIV. OF CHI.
L. REv. 69.8While there is no exact information, it appears inferentially from CODE JUSTINIAN,
4, 20, 17; 4, 20, 19; that a party under the Roman law could not generally impeach
his own witness. During that period when it became difficult or impossible for a party
to prove his case, he might call on the other party to prove his claim or defense by
making his statement under oath. When this was done, the so-called "decisory oath"
-was binding and could not be contradicted. Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 220, 202
Pac. 1099 (1921).
9Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witnesses-New Developments (1936) 4 UNIV.
-OF Cm. L. REV. 69, 70.
'
0 Even as late as Bushnell's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670), the jurors were
permitted to rely on their own information to nullify any testimony given in court. Cf.
Rex v. Hutton, 4 Maule & S. 532 (1816).
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involving the impeachment rule until the sixteenth century, and its first
reported application in 1681 in Fitzharris' Tria"l--a century after compurga-
tion had dropped into disuse, and just about the time the criminal trial be-
came an adversary proceeding.12 Professor Morgan agrees with Dean Ladd
that the rule against impeaching one's own witness fits naturally into the
"emerging adversary theory of litigation . . . -any influence by way of com-purgation operating indirectly and probably without deliberation."'13
REASONS UNDERLYING THE RULE
In 1681, when the rule against impeaching one's own witness was first
announced,'1 4 its proponents defended it on the primitive notion that a party is
morally bound by all the statements of his witness.' 5 This ethical basis was
early repudiated, however, for it had always been a well-settled corollary of
the impeachment rule that a party who called a witness was not thereby
barred from contradicting him on material issues (from showing by other
testimony that the facts were not as he testified).' Any moral notion re-
garding impeachment was inconsistent with the rule allowing contradiction;
so, by 1800, judges abandoned the ethical support for the rule and cast about
for a more plausible reason.
The basis shortly thereafter announced was that by putting a witness on the
stand the party calling him guarantees his credibility.T  As Professor Green-
leaf stated it:
"When a party offers a witness in proof of his cause, he thereby repre-
sents him as worthy of belief. He is presumed to know the character
of the witnesses he adduces and having thus presented them to the
court, the law will not permit the party afterwards to impeach their gen-
eral reputation for truth."'
The mere statement of this reason betrays its narrow unreality. Should
implied guarantees be allowed to bind an unwitting party who first discovers
his witness' untrustworthiness after putting him on the stand? The truth of
the fact is that today in the conduct of trials neither party knows, much less
118 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (1681).1 2By the time of Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 636 (1681), the criminal prose-
cution had become an adversary proceeding, and the rule prohibiting impeachment of
one's own witness was well settled. Shortly thereafter, the first civil case on the
subject appeared. Adams v. Arnold, 12 Mod. 375, 90 Eng. Rep. 1064 (1700). There,
Holt, C.J., refused "to suffer the plaintiff to discredit a witness of his own calling, he
having testified against him." For a collection of earliest American cases stating the
impeachment prohibition, See Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 222, 202 Pac. 1099 (1921).laMorgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1936) 4 UNIV. OF CHI.
L. REv. 247, 258.
14Fitzharris' Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (1681) ; Colledge's Trial, 8 How.
St. Tr. 549, 636 (1681).
153 WiamoRo, EVIDEN cE (3d ed. 1940) § 897, and cases cited therein.
16Rice v. Oatfield, 2 Stra. 1095 (1738) ; Bradley v. Ricardo, 8 Bing. 58 (1831) ; Brown
v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 187, 194 (Mass. 1826).
'
TWhitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 545 (Mass. 1834); Pollack v. Pollack, 71 N. Y.
152 (1877).
18 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (1866) § 442.
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guarantees, the character or trustworthiness of his witnesses.19 Further-
more, permission is universally given to discredit one's own witness by
showing the material facts to be contrary to his assertion.20 A law which
allows the party to discredit through other witnesses what his prior witness
has said and at the same time speaks of a guarantee of credibility refutes
itself, and its rationale is utterly devoid of reality.
21
A third and equally false notion argued in support of the rule is that if a
party is allowed to impeach his own witness he will have a "club" with which
to coerce the witness to testify as the party desires, not as the truth may
dictate.22 This reason, though at first glance easy to grasp, is illegitimate in
policy.
The rule prohibiting a party from impeaching his own witness never fully
protected the witness,23 for the opposing party could always attack the wit-
ness' credibility.2 4 Prohibiting thd offering party from doing likewise puts
him at a tactical disadvantage while only partially protecting the witness.
To illustrate: Under the present law if I put X on the stand and he tells the
story I desire, I have no wish to impeach him, but my adversary has a perfect
right to attack X's credibility (and will if he can). If X surprises me and
testifies to my disadvantage, I have no right to impeach him, and my oppo-
nent, having the right but no desire to disturb favorable evidence, will not
object to X's reputation for veracity.25 My opponent can thus decide, by well
considered impeaching attacks, which evidence the jury will hear and which it
will not.26 Should a partisan ever be accorded so prejudicial an advantage?
Does not the need of protecting the witness pale into insignificance beside
this injustice in the operation of the common law rule?
19 May, Some Rules of Evidence (1876) 11 AmER. LAW REv. 264.
203 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 907, and cases cited therein; 2 FORD, LAW OF
EVIDENCE (1935) § 132. Hunter v. Wetsall, 84 N. Y. 549 (1881); Coulter v. Amer.
Merchants Union Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585 (1874).21Sanchez v. The People, 22 N. Y. 147 (1860), contains an excellent critical analysis
of the guarantee reasoning and its fallacies.
22 BuLLER, TRiALs AT Nisi PRIUS (1767) 297; 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)
§ 899; People v. Minsky, 227 N. Y. 94, 124 N. E. 126 (1919).
23See Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witwsses-New Developments (1936) 4
UNIv. OF Cni. L. REV. 69, 82.24 1t is well settled in New York that a party may attack the credibility of his oppo-
nent's witnesses (1) by interrogating him as to any criminal, vicious, or disgraceful
act in his life, (2) by introducing contradictory statements made out of court as to
matters material to the issue, where a proper foundation is laid therefor, or (3) by intro-
ducing evidence of a bad reputation for truth and veracity. People v. Webster, 139
N. Y. 73, 34 N. E. 730 (1893) ; Sitterly v. Gregg, 90 N. Y. 686 (1882). See generally
2 FORD, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1935) § 146 ff.
25Judge May, writing in 1876, forcefully exposed the fallacy of the coercion argument.
.. how can it be of importance to the main purpose of the trial how or by whom the
fact that a witness is not to be relied on is made known? If he betrays the party who
calls him and falsifies every statement which he makes, the opposite party will of course
accept the treason, say nothing of impeachment and leave the jury no alternative but
to find an unjust verdict upon evidence which both parties know to be the rankest per-
jury. . . .Nobody can profit by the rule but the witness and the antagonist of the
party who calls him and they only by the defeat of the ends of justice." May, Some
Rules of Evidencc (1876) 11 AMER. LAW REV. 267.
"26See supra, note 25.
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Upon analysis, then, the reasons advanced for the rule against impeaching
one's own witness are half-truths. Why then has the rule continued? The
inevitable conclusion is that the common law rule is the veriform appendix
of the law, which should be cut from the general body of evidence. It re-
mains to be seen what, if any, attempts have been made to remove it from the
law of New York.
HISTORY OF ATTACKS UPON THE IMPEACHMENT
RULE IN NEW YORK
The first decision ir New York to state that a party cannot impeach his
own witness was Lawrence v. Barker.27 There the trial court had refused
to let the defendant contradict the testimony of one of his own witnesses by
proof of prior inconsistent statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating
in broadest terms that a party cannot impeach his own witness by evidence
of bad character or of prior inconsistent statements.28 The court was willing
to allow the defendant to prove the facts by other witnesses and thus show
that the first witness' account was incorrect; but it was not willing to let a
witness be contradicted by his own prior inconsistent statements.
The rule'so dogmatically announced was far from settled. In People v.
Safford,29 seventeen years later, the court, in repudiating a similar attempt by
the district attorney to impeach his own witness by evidence of prior incon-
sistent statements before the grand jury, admitted that the authorities were
in irreconcilable conflict and that the question could not be decided on direct
authority.30 Casting about for a principle on which to exclude the evidence,
the court reasoned that since "the law denies a party the right to impeach his
own witness by evidence of bad character, the party should not be allowed
to give evidence of any sort for the sole purpose of impeaching his own wit-
n ess." 
1
It was against the background ot these two cases-each arriving indepen-
•dently of the other 32 at the conclusion that a party should not be allowed to
impeach his own witness-that the first attack on the impeachment rule was
made.
In 1849, David Dudley Field sought to incorporate into his Code of Civil
Procedure two sections designed to change the impeachment rule. This pro-
-posal found in Sections 1845 and 1847, Part 4 of the Code relating to
Evidence, read as follows:
275 Wend. 301 (N. Y. 1830).
285 Wend. 301, 305 (N. Y. 1830).
295 Denio 112 (N. Y. 1847).30It is interesting to note that the court in People v. Safford can find no case authority
-on the problem in New York. Lawrewe v. Barker, supra note 27, is not cited; instead,
the court reasons the case out on principle and arrives at a perfect statement of the
absolute common law rule prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness.315 Denio 112, 118 (N. Y. 1847). The problem raised by People v. Safford has been
remedied in New York by § 266 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, infra note 41.
-Today if testimony by a witness is inconsistent with that given by him before the grandjury, any court can require a grand juror to disclose what the witness said in that
-prior proceeding. See generally Ward Baking Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 205
-App. Div. 723, 200 N. Y. Supp. 865 (3d Dep't 1923).
32See supra, note 30.
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"§ 1845. The party producing a witness, is not allowed to impeach
his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may contradict him by
other evidence, and may also show that he has made at other times, state-
ments inconsistent with his present testimony, as provided in § 1848.
"§ 1848. A witness may also be impeached, by evidence that he has
made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony;
but before this can be done, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of times, places and persons present; and he must be
asked whether he has made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness,
before any question is put to him concerning them."
But the Field Code of Civil Procedure failed of adoption in New York,
and the above change never took place. Though rejected by his native New
York, these draft sections were influential in causing England to provide
for a similar change of its rule of impeachment in the Common Law Proce-
dure Act of 1854.33
Field's ill-fated attempt, however, made the New York courts aware of the
irrational foundation of the common law rule. In Sanchez v.- The People
(1860),3 4 when the question of the right of counsel to impeach his own wit-
ness next arose, we find the Court of Appeals splitting on the question. Two
judges, Selden and Clerke, dissented on the ground that if a party can correct
his own witnesses-even to the extent of contradicting them by other wit-
nesses-he should be allowed to impeach his own witnesses or weaken their
credibility by their own previous contradictory statements.3 5 This initial
attack on the common law rule paved the way for the inroad made upon it
in the now famous case of Bullard v. Pearsall (1873).36
In that case, the plaintiff was suing to rescind for fraud the sale of an
interest in a patent right. The plaintiff contended that the sale had been
made in June, 1868. To prove this, the plaintiff called one Thompson, "but
to the surprise of the plaintiff the witness testified that the conversation took
place on the 24th of July." The date being material, the plaintiff was per-
mitted to ask the witness whether he had not upon a prior examination sworn
that the conversation took place in June. The witness admitted that he had,
but stated that by consulting a memorandum he had found that he was mis-
taken, and that actually the conversation had taken place on the 24th of July.
There was a further question to the witness about that matter which the court
excluded. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment for the defendant, alleging
that the trial court had erred in not permitting him to contradict his own
witness.
3317 & 18 Vict. c. 125, § 22 (1854).
3422 N. Y. 147 (1860).35Clerke, J., dissenting states: "... I consider the interests of justice will be best
promoted by allowing every party to correct the testimony of witnesses whether called
by himself or not. I know of no principle more unjust and more inexpedient than to
conclude a party by whatever his witness swears without giving him every opportunity
of correcting the testimony if the witness should intentionally or unintentionally swear
falsely."
3653 N. Y. 230 (1873).
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In affirming the trial court's judgment, judge Rapallo stated:
"Where a witness disappoints the party calling him by testifying
contrary to the expectations and wishes of such party, it is a conceded
rule that the latter shall not, for the purpose of relieving himself from
the effect of such evidence, be permitted to prove that the witness is a
person of bad character arjd unworthy of belief. There is also a great
weight of authority sustaining the position that under such circumstances
the party calling the witness should not be allowed to prove that he has on
other occasions made statements inconsistent with his testimony at the
trial, when the sole object of such proof is to discredit the witness. But
it is well established that the party calling the witness is not absolutely
bound by his statements, and may show by other witnesses that they are
erroneous. The further question has frequently arisen whether the party
calling the witness should, upon being taken by surprise by unexpected
testimony, be permitted to interrogate the witness in respect to his own
previous declarations, inconsistent with his evidence. Upon this point
there is considerable conflict in the authorities. We are of the opinion that
such questions may be asked of the witness for the purpose of probing
his recollection, recalling to his mind the statements he has previously
made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent inconsistency.
This course of examination may result in satisfying the witness that he
has fallen into error and that his original statements were correct, and it
is calculated to elicit the truth. It is also proper for the purpose of
showing the circumstances which induced the party to call him. Though
the arvswers of the witness may involve him in contradictions calculated
to impair his credibility, that is not a sufficient reason for excluding the
inquiry. Proof of other witnesses that his statements are incorrect
would have the same effect, yet the admissibility of such proof cannot be
questioned. It is only evidence offered for the mere purpose of im-
peaching the, credibility of the witness, which is inadmissible when
offered by the party calling him. Inquiries calculated to elicit the facts,
or to show to the witness that he is mistaken and to induce him to correct
his evidence, should not be excluded simply because they may result
unfavorably to his credibility. In case he should deny having made pre-
vious statements inconsistent with his testimony, we do not think it would
be proper to allow such statements to be proved by other witnesses; but
where the questions as to such statements are confined to the witness
himself, we think they are admissible. As a matter of course, such pre-
vious unsworn statements are not evidence, and when the trial is before
a jury that instruction should be given. '" 3 7
3753 N. Y. 230, 231 (1873). The Bullard v. Pearsall rule has been applied in a num-
ber of reported cases in New York. In Blum v. Munzesheimer, 66 Hun 633, 21 N. Y.
Supp. 498 (Sup. Ct. 1892), plaintiff-seller sought to recover the purchase price of
goods ordered by one Zuckerman for defendant-buyer. To prove the purchasing agency,
plaintiff called defendants' brother who testified contrary to an affidavit in plaintiff's
possession. Plaintiff's counsel thereupon called the witness' attention to the affidavit,
and asked him "to make such explanation as full and detailed as possible with a viev
to eliciting correct answers and thus establishing the truth and to state in what respects
if any you were mistaken in your testimony and if possible why you were mistaken?"
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This right to refresh the witness' recollection of an apparently inconsistent
statement was not new. It had been laid down in England in Melhuish v.
Collier38 and Wright v. Beckett,"9 and by 1854 had been codified in the statute
17 and 18 Victoria, Chapter 125, Section 22.40
Bullard v. Pearsall was a desirable departure from the general rule against
impeachment. The first great wedge driven into the absolute common law
prohibition, it opened the way for further attempts to broaden the rule.
The first of these was minor. In 1881, the legislature of New York
enacted Section 266 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
a member of the grand jury may be required by the court to disclose the
testimony given by a witness before the grand jury for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether such testimony is consistent with that given by the witness
before the court.41 Here for the first time direct impeachment by the court
Held: this was a proper mode of refreshing witness' memory. It was calculated to
elicit the truth, explain the testimonial conflict and did not necessarily impair the wit-
ness' credibility.
In People v. Ricker, 51 Hun 643, 4 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1889), the dis-
trict attorney, prosecuting an indictment for burglary, put a witness for the People
on the stand. When the witness testified contrary to what he had said before the
grand jury, the district attorney introduced the grand jury record and asked him to
explain the inconsistencies in his testimony. The witness testified that what he had
said before the grand jury was untrue. Held: the questioning was competent within
Bullard v. Pearsall. It explained the district attorney's surprise and tended only indi-
rectly to impeach the witness.
See further People v. Kelley, 113 N. Y. 647, 651, 21 N. E. 122 (1889); Maloney v.
Martin, 81 App. Div. 432, 80 N. Y. Supp. 763 (4th Dep't 1903). Whether a question
is calculated to probe recollection, to draw out an explanation of inconsistency, to ex-
plain surprise, and only indirectly and not necessarily to impeach the witness' credibility
is a difficult question of fact to decide or to review on appeal. It is impossible today to
state with accuracy how far counsel may question under the refreshment rule. In
fact, it is questionable whether Bullard v. Pearsall continues to be a method of impeach-
ment allowed in New York. See infra, p. 388; see especially People v. Romano, 279
N. Y. 392, 18 N. E. (2d) 634 (1939).
3815 Q. B. 878, 117 Eng. Rep. 690 (1850).
891 Moo. & Rob. 414, 174 Eng. Rep. 143 (1833).40See supra, note 33. The rule announced in Bullard v. Pearsall has been adopted in
many other jurisdictions. See Carpenter's Appeal, 74 Conn. 431, 51 Atl. 126 (1902);
National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 42 Ill. App. 178 (1891); Humble v. Shoemaker, 70
Iowa 223, 30 N. W. 492 (1886); Hall v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 84 Iowa 311, 51
N. W. 150 (1892); Commonwealth v. Brown, 150 Mass. 330, 23 N. E. 49 (1889);
State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W. 449 (1890); Creighton v. Modern Woodmen,
90 Mo. App. 378 (1901); State v. Draughn, 140 Mo. App. 263, 124 S. W. 20 (1910);
George v. Triplett, 5 N. D. 50, 63 N. W. 891 (1895) ; Weygandt v. Bartle, 88 Ore.
310, 171 Pac. 587 (1918). For an excellent discussion of Bullard v. Pearsall, see Holt-
zoff, The New York Rule as to Impeachment by a Party of His Ownr Witnesses (1924)
24 COL. L. Rv. 715. See also Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687, 689, 16 Sup.
Ct. 923 (1896), for an analysis of the impeachment by refreshment rule and whether it
is a rule of refreshment or impeachment.
41§ 266 of the 'Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "A member of the grand jury
may, however, be required by any court, to disclose the testimony of a witness exam-
ined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent
with that given by the witness before the court; or to disclose the testimony given
before them by any person upon a charge against him for perjury in giving his testi-
mony, or upon his trial therefor." This section was derived in part from Revised
Statutes of New York, pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 4, § 31 (1828).
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through prior oral statements is sanctioned in New York. It is clear from
the statute that it embraces a method of impeaching one's own witness. The
right of the court to examine a grand juror is not made dependent on sur-
prise; neither is it rationalized as a refreshment of recollection.4s
The first real attack, however, came in the nineteen-thirties. For years
lawyers, judges and bar associations had attacked the "illogic" of the rule
prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness. 43  In 1934, the Commission
on Administration of Justice in New York recommended to the legislature
the enactment of a new section of the Civil Practice Act to provide:
"The party who calls a witness shall not be precluded from impeach-
ing him by proof of prior contradictory statements or by evidence of
bias or corruption or in any other manner, except that the party calling
the witness shall not be permitted to prove the bad reputation of the
witness for truth and veracity or to prove that he was convicted of a
crime unless such proof is offered prior to or at the beginning of the
examination of the witness or unless the court is satisfied that such bad
reputation or conviction was discovered by the party subsequent to the
witness giving his testimony.
'44
The proposed statute was similar to the English law derived from the
original Field Code. 45 But it was defeated in the 1934 and 1935 legislatures
because the legislators feared the proposal violated the hearsay evidence rule
-that a jury might use the admissible impeaching testimony as substantive
proof.
4 6
42See supra, note 41. It is interesting to note that under § 266 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the prior inconsistent statements of the witness to the grand jury can be
shown either (1) by reading from the stenogi'aphic notes or (2) by the testimony of
one of the members of the jury, but not by the testino ay of the grand jury stenographer.
People v. Goodheim, 188 App. Div. 148, 176 N. Y. Supp. 468 (1st Dep't 1919).4 3 See supra, note 4. For additional attacks upon the rule prohibiting impeachment
of one's own witness, see Witnesses, Report of the Crime Commision of New York
State, Legislative Document 94 (1927) 70; Report of the Committee on Law Reform,
Reports of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1930) 235.4 4 Recommended Changes in Practice, Procedure and Evidence, Report of the Com-
mission on the Administration of Justice in New York State, Legislative Document 92
(1934) § 38. This same recommendation of the Commission was reintroduced into
the 1935 legislature. Legislative Recommendations, First Supplemental Report of the
Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State, Legislative Document
71 (1935) 10.4 5 See supra p. 382. The English Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 125, § 22 (1854) provides: "A
party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence
of bad character; but he may,. in case the witness shall in the opinion of the judge prove
adverse, contradict him by other evidence, or by leave of the judge 'prove that he has
made at other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony."46 Report of the Committee on Law Reform, Reports of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (1936) 196; see also Greene, 1935 Legislative Program
Results (1935) 13 THE PANEL 3, 7. This fear was best expressed in the New York
County Lawyers' Report prepared by Louis Fabricant, where it was stated: "Under
this proposed statute, the prior inconsistent statements of the witness called by a party
could be shown even if they were not under oath and not in writing. Thus a party
disappointed with the testimony of a witness could bring in some person to testify that
in a conversation with the witness, the witness had told a different story. Such different
story would thus get before the jury and the witness' present testimony under oath
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In 1936, the issue was again presented to the legislature-this time by the
newly-created Judicial Councilyt Because of the rough treatment which
the Commission's proposal had received at the hands of both the New York
County Lawyers' Association and the State Legislature, 47* the new recom-
mendations were quite mild. "In addition to the manner of impeachment
already allowed by law," the Council recommended impeachment by means
of pribr statements if made in writing or under oath.48
The Council refused to allow oral inconsistent statements to be admitted.
Such would afford "too much leeway in impeachment and might well be used
as a means of coercion. '49  The prohibition against introducing evidence of
the bad reputation for veracity of one's own witness remained absolute.
The statute was adopted in substantially the form recommended, and with
a minor alteration 0 continues to be the final statement of the rule against
impeachment in New York.
IMPEACHMENT IN NEW YORK UNDER § 343a OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
AND § 8a OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The statutory changes of 1936 seemed to end New York's impeachment
troubles. A New York lawyer could put his witness on the stand, and if the
witness surprised him, he was allowed to refresh the witness' recollection
of prior inconsistent statements ;51 or if he had a prior inconsistent statement
in writing or under oath, he could prove that writing by other witnesses. 2
He could also apply to the court to have it call up a grand juror to'testify as
to prior inconsistent statements made by his witness in that hearing.53
would be impeached by someone depending solely on his recollection of a conversation
previously had with the witness. Casual utterances of the witness could be distorted
and the distortions offered by the party who calls the witness for the purpose of im-
peaching him. . . . It does not seem wise to allow the impeachment process to make
use of conflicting, extra-judicial, unauthorized oral statements." Report of the Com-
mittee on Criminal Courts, New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Report 68 (1936).4 7Recommendations to Permit Contradiction of One's Own Witness, Report of the
Judicial Council of New York State, Legislative Document 48 (1936) 1.79.47*See rupra, note 46.
48The Council recommended the following amendment to both § 343 of the C.P.A.
and § 8 of the C.C.P.: "In addition to impeachment in the manner now permitted by
law, any party may introduce proof that a witness has made a prior statement incon-
sistent with his testimony, irrespective of the fact that the party has called the witness
or made the witness his own, provided that such prior inconsistent statement was made
in any writing by him subscribed or in any action or special proceeding or upon any hear-
ing or inquiry or in any testimony, declaration, deposition, certificate or affidavit."4 9 See supra, note 47.50 In 1937, the legislature deleted "in any action or special proceeding or upon any
hearing or inquiry or in any testimony, declaration, deposition, certificate or affidavit"
and substituted therefore "or was made under oath." It was feared that the word
"declaration" contained in the last phrase of § 343a of the C.P.A. and § 8a of the
C.C.P. might be interpreted to include any prior oral statement-a result which neither
the legislature nor the Judicial Council intended. The statute as amended thus allows
impeachment of one's own witness by proof that such witness made prior contradictory
statements either in writing or under oath. See Reports of the Committee on State
Legislation, New York County Lawyers' Association, Report 144 (1937) 337.5 1 Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230 (1873), .rupra note 37.
52§ 343a of the C.P.A. and § 8a of the C.C.P., mipra notes 48, 50.
53§ 266 of the C.C.P., supra note 41.
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New York seemed well on the way toward the abolition of the common
law rule. However, two recent decisions by the Court of Appeals have given
a rude shock to those who hope for complete impeachment in New York.
In People v. Romano,54 the Court of Appeals raised doubts as to whether
the Bullard v. Pearsall refreshment rule continues to be a method of im-
peachment in New York. In the RoMaiw case, one Frances Granziano was
raped by a group of men. She sought to convict Romano (one of the de-
fendants) by her own testimony corroborated by that of Asaro (another de-
fendant). In a pre-trial examination, Asaro was brought from Elmira
State Reformatory and questioned by the district attorney. A stenographic
report was made of the examination but it was never signed by the witness.
In this grilling, Asaro orally admitted to the district attorney that Romano
was present when the rape occurred; but when put on the stand at the trial,
he denied knowledge of Romano's presence. 54' The district attorney, sur-
prised at the hostility of his witness, sought to question him as to his prior
inconsistent statements by way of refreshing his recollection. 55 Some state-
ments Asaro denied making; others he admitted in part, explaining their in-
consistency. The Court of Appeals disapproved of the attempt at impeach-
ment. "No inconsistent prior utterance of the co-defendant was admissible
unless it had been sworn to or subscribed by him.' 56 The court makes no
mention of the Bullard v. Pearsall rule, but its positive statement of Section
54279 N. Y. 392, 18 N. E. (2d) 634 (1939).
54
*The problem which the Ronzano case raised was foreseen by Mr. Sol Boneparth in
his statements before the Governor's Conference on Crime. In commenting on the
newly proposed impeachment statute (§ 8a of the Code of Criminal Procedure) he
stated: "In the section as it is now framed impeachment is permitted where the district
attorney is in possession of either sworn statements or statements signed by the witness
sought to be impeached. . . . In my experience [as assistant district attorney, Bronx
County) statements which are taken from witnesses in advance of the trial are, in
most cases, not in writing and not signed. [They are taken by a stenographer.] We
don't ask the witness to wait until the statement is written out because if we do ask
him to wait and sign it, the witness may between the time he has given the statement
and the time that it is written out, upon reflection, refuse to sign it or hesitate to
sign it. . .
"You have a stenographic statement or in the case of an arrest by a policeman upon
the complaint of a victim who identifies the defendant to the policeman, while you will
never get anything written from the witness you have that statement wherein he
accused the arrested man and identified him to the policeman, and it seems to me that
should be just as effective in impeaching a witness as a statement which he has signed
on sober reflection. In that respect I would suggest an amendment to the proposed
section."
It is interesting to note that if Mr. Boneparth's suggestion that unsigned stenographic
notes be admissible as impeaching evidence had been adopted by the legislature, the
problem of the Roniano case would never have arisen; for, there, such notes existed,
but they had never been signed by Asaro and were, therefore, inadmissible under § 8a
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Both Mr. Felix Benyenga (assistant district
attorney, New York County) and Mr. Philip Halperin (University of Buffalo Law
School) concurred in Mr. Boneparth's suggestion that the statute allow impeachment
through any prior inconsistent statement, whether oral or written. Prosecution and the
Courts, Proceedings of the Governor's Conference on Crime, the Criminal and Society
(1935) 733-741.
5 5Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230 (1873), supra note 37.
56279 N. Y. 392, 394, 18 N. E. (2d) 634 (1939).
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8a of the Code of Criminal Procedure seems to leave no doubt as to the
basis of its ruling.
There are three possible interpretations of the court's decision. First, the
court refused to allow the attempt at refreshment despite Bullard v. Pearsall.
The new statute, the court suggests, is the exclusive method of impeachment
in New York, replacing all other modes.57 Second, the court may have found
that the attempt to refresh Asaro's mind was proper; but in answering the
refreshing questions, the witness denied the prior inconsistent statements and
thereby prevented further proof of them through other witnesses.58  Under
this view, the question of Asaro's credibility was properly raised for the jury
to consider; but if the jury, in discrediting his testimony on the stand, recog-
nized the prior statements made to the district attorney, it must also recognize
that Asaro was an accomplice at law ;5 and his testimony as an accomplice
was not sufficient to convict Romano as the rapist within Section 399 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 60
Finally, the court may have found the attempted impeachment of Asaro
valid and successful. If this view is correct, the jury should have viewed
Asaro's testimony as neutralized by the impeachment. 61 Since Asaro's was
the only testimony which linked Romano with the crime, with the failure of
his testimony as affirmative evidence went the failure of proof of a material
element of the indictment. 62
57The court's opinion intimates that the district attorney's questioning as to Asaro's
prior inconsistent statement went beyond the impeachment statute because such state-
ment was neither in writing nor under oath. Supra, notes 48, 50. This conclusion is
reached d~spite the fact that the statute's express preamble, "In addition to impeach-
ment in the manner now permitted by law," was intended to preserve the Bullard v.
Pearsall rule-the right of codnsel to impeach his own witness by way of refreshment.
See Report of the Committee on State Legislation, New York County Lawyers' Ass'n,
Report 17 (1936) 191: "The new statute will not change the rule that one's own witness
may be reminded of an inconsistent oral statement, not under oath, for the purpose of
refreshing his recollection,° although not for the purpose of impeachment. People v.
Purtell, 243 N. Y. 273, 280."5 8It is a well settled corollary to the Bullard v. Pearsall refreshment rule that if the
witness denies having made the prior inconsistent statements, such statements cannot
be proved by other witnesses. See People v. Purtell, 243 N. Y. 273, 153 N. E. 72
(1926) ; 2 FORD, LAW OF EVIDENCE (1935) § 131. The value of the right to refresh
lies in the impeaching force of the question, containing the prior inconsistent statement,
rather than in any answer that may be given by the witness. See generally, Holtzoff,
The New York Rule as to Impeachment by a Party of His Own Witnwsses (1924)
24 COL. L. REV. 715.5 9The tenor of the prior contradictory statements, if admitted, was not only to
place Romano at the scene of the crime, but also to establish Asaro's status as an
accomplice within § 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See People v. Romano,
279 N. Y. 392, 394," 18 N. E. (2d) 634 (1939).6 OThough Asaro's prior statements did identify Romano as the rapist, they alone were
not sufficient to convict because testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated before
a conviction may be had thereon; and there was no "other evidence" tending to identify
Romano as the rapist, within the requirements of § 399 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940) ; People v. Nitzberg,
287 N. Y. 210, 38 N. E. (2d) 490 (1941).6 ISee generally 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1018. See also Charlton v.
Unis, 4 Gratt 60 (Va. 1847) ; Gould v. Norfolk Lead. Co., 9 Cush. 346 (Mass. 1855) ;
Roge v. Valentine, 280 N. Y. 268, 20 N. E. (2d) 751 (1939) ; Simon v. Lowenthal, 169
Misc. 718. 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 484 (1939).
62§ 2013 of the Penal Code reads: "No conviction can be had for rape or defilement
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Whichever of these three views of the Ronvno case is adopted, one conclu-
sion is certain: whether Bullard v. Pearsall continues to be the law of New
York is doubtful. Under the first interpretation of the Romano decision,
Sections 343a of the C. P. A. and 8a of the C. C. P. became law at the
sacrifice of that other long-recognized method of impeachment-that of re-
freshment of recollection. 63
This conclusion from the Romano case was, strengthened two years later
by Jenkins v. 313-321 West 37th St. Corp.,0 4 where the Court of Appeals,
applying Section 343a of the C. P. A., stated:
"The recent statute is in derogation of the common law and must be
strictly construed. Such construction does not admit of the use of other
than signed statements or statements under oath to impeach one's own
witness in New York." 65
This marks the end of the story to date. The deepest inroad that has been
made on a rule universally condemned by all authorities is that one's own
witness can be impeached only by a prior inconsistent statement and then
only when in writing or under oath. The present New York statute has not
inspired a crusade against the old rule. The courts have failed to broaden the
statutory mandate. Any legislative attempt at piecemeal reform seems
doomed to strict construction by the courts. The time has come for the legis-
lature to strike a complete blow against the ancient talisman.
FULL AND COMPLETE IMPEACHMENT: A PLEA
The failure of New York's attempts to change the common law rule pro-
hibiting impeachment is largely due to a failure to see that the ancient doc-
trine announced in the early days of compurgation66 does not fit the actual
facts presented by the modern jury trial. There is a vital distinction between
"oath helpers" and witnesses in the modern sense. Today, except in the
case of character witnesses and expert testimony, parties under the adversary
system do not choose any person they may like to place upon the witness
stand, but are forced to take those, good and bad, who by chance happen
to have heard or observed facts which pertain to the cause on trial.67 In
many cases-especially negligence actions, which constitute seventy-five per-
cent of the trial litigation in the courts today6s -the witnesses are personally
upon the testimony of the female defiled, unsupported by other evidence." Under this
section it has been held that there must be other proof, not only of the existence of the
crime, but of the defendant's perpetration thereof. See People v. Shaw, 158 App. Div.
146, 142 N. Y. Supp. 782 (3d Dep't 1913); People v. Downs, 236 N. Y. 306, 140 N. E.
706 (1923).
63See supra, note 57.
64284 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. (2d) 503 (1940).
65284 N. Y. 397, 403, 31 N. E. (2d) 503 (1940).
66See supra, note 7.67Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 56 N. W. 58 (1893) ; see May, Some Rides of
Evidence (1876) 11 AAi.p LAW REv. 264; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-
New Developments (1936) 4 U. oF Crl. L. REv. 69, 77.06Recommendations to Permit Contradiction of One's Own Witness, Reports of the
Judicial Council of New York State, Legislative Document 48 (1936) 181.
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unknown to the litigants. It is not only unreal but unfair to force a party
to be bound by the statements of his so-called "own witness" when he knows
the witness is lying. Any prohibition against impeaching one's own witness
is under modern conditions a real hindrance to the ascertainment of truth.
Courts have long recognized this unreality in the common law rule. Early
in the history of the prohibition it was recognized that a party did not so far
guarantee the credibility of his witness as to be precluded from contradicting
him by putting other witnesses on the stand to testify to their version of the
facts.69 The courts rationalized this by stating that the privilege was one of
contradiction, not impeachment.70 The contradiction theory, however, was
realistic. Witnesses may err. When they do, counsel can prove the truth
through others, refuting the honest but erroneous version of his own prior
witness.
Examples of how the general prohibition operates disclose its provincial-
ism. Nowhere in the field of evidence is a more ludicrous result reached
than in the case where one party calls his adversary as a witness. The courts
still hold that the producing party guarantees his adversary's credibility and
cannot impeach him generally. 71 Yet it is well settled that proof of any prior
inconsistent statement by the adversary is competent as an admission, but not
by way of impeachment. 72
These illustrations of the operation of the common law rule show where
any effective change must start. Any amendment must recognize that today
a party cannot choose his witnesses. He cannot predict what their testimony
will be. Any theory based on guarantees and vouchings is unreal. Parties
should be given the right to impeach any witness fully and completely.
The new statute should provide for impeachment by a party of his own
witness in the same manner and to the same extent as impeachment of an
opposing witness is now allowed by law. 73 A party should be allowed to
impeach his own witness (1) by prior inconsistent statements whether oral
or under oath, (2) by evidence of bad character, (3) by proof.of interest,
bias, or corruption.
1. Impeachment by inconsistent stateinents.-The new statute should allow
impeachment of one's own witness by prior inconsistent statements whether
69See supra, notes 16, 20.
7OSee generally 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 907. See also Lawrence v.
Barker, 5 Wend. 301, 305 (N. Y. 1830) ; Pollack v. Pollack, 71 N. Y. 137, 152 (1887);
De Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 490, 24 N. E. 996 (1890).
71See generally 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 916 and cases cited therein.
In New York the common law rule has been relaxed somewhat by § 343 of the Civil
Practice Act which provides: "The testimony of a party taken at the instance of the
adverse party orally or by deposition may be rebutted [contradicted] by other evidence."
See generally Crouse v. Frothingham, 27 Hun 123 (N. Y. 1882), rev'd, 97 N. Y. 105
(1884); Engel v. Dicter, 31 Misc. 793, 65 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1900). Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a party cannot only contradict, but
also impeach an adverse party of his own calling. Rule 43 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, infra note 79. See generally MooRE, FEDERAL PRActicE (1938)§ 43.03.
72Engel v. Dicter, supra note 71. For an interesting sidelight on the general im-
peachment problem, see Prince, 4dminssibility of Contradictory Statements to Impeach
Unavailable Witness; New York Rule (1940) 10 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 133.
73See supra, note 24.
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oral or written, whether under oath or not. This suggestion is not without
precedent. Massachusetts already has a similar statute,7 4 which represents
the legislation in ten states.7 5 Other jurisdictions allow the privilege of im-
peachment through any prior inconsistent statement provided that the wit-
ness prove adverse in the opinion of the court, 6 or provided that the party
producing him is surprised,77 "entrapped,"
78 or misled. 79
74Mass. Genl. Law (1932) c. 233, §§ 22, 23.
75ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 5196; CAL. CODE CIVIL PROC. (Deering, 1937)
§ 2049; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) c. 16 § 1207; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) c. 2
§ 1926; Ky. CODES ANN. (Carrols, 1932) Civ. Prac. § 596; MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10666; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) c. 9 §1909; TEx.
ANN. CODE CRIM. PRoc. (Vernon, 1941) § 732; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright,
1931) c. 89 § 1706. Furthermore, Tentative Draft No. 2 of the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement of Evidence allows a party calling a witness to impeach him by
a prior oral contradictory statement, not under oath, but gives the judge a discretionary
right to exclude such evidence unless the witness was so examined while testifying,
as to give him an opportunity to deny or explain the statement.
Tentative Rule 106 on Impeachment reads as follows (italics added)
"(1) Subject to Paragraph (2) and (3) of this Rule, for the purpose of impairing
or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party icluding the party calling him may
(a) examine him concerning any conduct by him and any other matter of substantial
probative value upon the issue of this credibility as a witness, without being required,
in examining him as to a statement made by him in writing inconsistent with any part
of his testimony, to show or read to him any part of the writing; and (b) introduce
other evidence of his conduct or of other matter having such substantial probative
value, except that evidence of traits of his character, other than honesty or veracity
or of his commission or conviction of a crime not involving dishonesty or false state-
ment shall be inadmissible.
"(2) The judge in his discretion may exclude evidence of a written or oral statement
of the witness offered under Paragraph (1) (b) of this Rule unless the witness was
so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to deny or explain the
statement.
"(3) For the purpose of impairing the credibility of an accused in a criminal action
who testifies at the trial therein, the accused shall not at that trial be examined, nor
shall any evidence be admitted, as to facts tending to prove his commission or conviction
of another crime, unless he has first introduced evidence of his good character to support
his credibility." Cf. RESTATEMiENT, EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 18, 1940) Rules
122, 123, 124, and comments thereto.
76 FLA. ComP. GEN. LAwS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 4377; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1929) c. 45 § 607; VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) 1702; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930)
§ 6215; HAWAIr REV. LAWS (1935) § 3835.
'
7 LA. CODE Cam!. PRoc. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§ 487, 488; D. C. CODE (1929) Tit. 9, § 21.
7 8 GA. CODE (1933) § 5879.79 Phillipine Islands, Code Civil Proc. (1901) § 340. It is interesting to note that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure continue the prohibition that a party cannot im-
peach his own witness, subject however to the following exceptions: (1) If the witness
is an adverse party (or an officer, etc. thereof) he may be impeached, and (2) Rule
26 (d) (1) provides that "any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness."
Rule 43 (b) reads: "Scope of Examination and Cross-Examination. A party may
interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call
an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corpo-
ration or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him
by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been
called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and im-
peached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the
adverse party only upon the subiect matter of his examination in chief."
The original draft (April, 1937) of this rule, as amended by the final report, read:
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The admission of prior oral statements would not violate the hearsay rule
as commonly feared,80 for they are not offered as substantive evidence to
prove what the actual facts at issue were. They would merely show that the
hostile witness had on a prior occasion told a totally different story, and that,
therefore, his credibility is questionable. The impeaching statements would
neutralize the record testimony, and would not be substituted for the witness'
original statements.
Finally admission of prior inconsistent statements need not result in the
jury's considering unsworn impeaching testimony as substantive evidence on
the issues of the case. This danger, common to all types of impeachment,":
can be successfully guarded against by the trial judge's charge to the jury8 2
2. Impeachnwnt by bad character.--Most statutes which allow impeachment
by evidence of prior inconsistent statements expressly disallow character im-
peachment.8 The reason for this is partly historical. Almost all the legisla-
tion on impeachment is the product of a "tendency to copy first proposals
rather than make an independent investigation of the merits of the rule."8 4
The numerous states which have followed the Field proposal refuse to allow
character impeachment simply because it was frowned on by the early codi-
fiers.85
The objection most commonly made to character impeachment is that it
would tend to coerce the witness.8 6 This fear was best stated in People v.
Minsky :87
"A party should not be permitted after having unsuccessfully taken a
chance to secure favorable testimony to attack his own witness. The
power to coerce a witness may as reasonably be expected to beget a lie as
to force the truth from unwilling lips."
A party may show that any witness, whether called by him or by an adverse
party, has previously made, under oath or otherwise, statements contradictory to his
testimony without having first called them to his attention." The Supreme Court, how-
ever, struck this passage from the rule as finally enacted because it feared that such
provision would "abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of litigants'"-a result
which the rule-makers had no jurisdiction to effect and one which the enabling act
expressly prohibited. See 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 723b (1934).
This failure of the Federal Rules to allow complete impeachment through prior oral
inconsistent statements has been widely criticized. See MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938)
§ 43.04; Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Part 2 (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 194, 201.
80See WIGMORE, EViDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1018. State v. Mulholland, 16 La. Ann.
377 1861) ; State v. Johnson, 12 Munn. 488 (1867) ; Dixon v. Walker, 206 App. Div.
565, 202 N. Y. Supp. 283 (3d Dep't 1923). For a good general discussion of impeach-
ment through prior inconsistent statements and the hearsay evidence rule, see Crago
v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1921).
S3Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (1936) 4 U. OF
CI. L. REv. 69, 87.82See supra, note 80. See especially Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 225, 202 Pac. 1099
(1921), and cases cited therein.83See supra, notes 74, 75 if.
84Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (1936) 4 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 69, 91.
85 See § 1845, Part 4 of Field's Draft Code of Evidence, supra p. 382.
86For a general discussion of the protection-against-coercion rationale, see supra,
p. 380. See also Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24, 27 (1883).
87227 N. Y. 94, 99, 124 N. E. 126 (1919).
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This argument fails to take into account two factors which should make
character evidence admissible: (a) The rule against character impeachment is
not designed to protect the witness, because the witness is always open to
"character assassination" by the defendant. The defendant's right to depre-
cate the witness' reputation for truth and veracity is just as coercive an influ-
ence on the witness' testimony as plaintiff's potential right so to impeach
might be. (b) Moreover, if only the defendant is allowed to impeach by
evidence of bad character, he can impeach a witness telling the truth against
his interests, and refrain from exercising the same power in the case of
plaintiff's hostile witness who is improving his case. Limiting the right of
impeachment to one party gives that party an unfair advantage in the receipt
of testimony. 88
Finally, the protection-against-coercion rationale assumes that plaintiff's
counsel is dishonest, ready to force a recalcitrant witness to lie under a
threat of character impeachment. This is highly improbable, for the dishon-
est attorney could never be sure that fear of impeachment would cause his
witness to falsify in his favor. The threat of perjury would have a more
forceful countervailing influence on the witness' telling the truth.8 9  Also,
few attorneys would dare incur the suspicion of the-jury-by constantly putting
their witnesses on the stand only to discredit them and leave no substantive
testimony.90
3. Impeachment by interest, bias, or corruption.-The proposed statute advo-
cates impeachment of one's own witness by evidence of interest, bias, or cor-
ruption for the same reasons impeachment by evidence of bad character is
favored. The possibility that such a privilege may be used as a club to force
false testimony is less to be feared than the injustice of allowing corrupted
witne-sses, free from attack, to prejudice the party's case.
CONCLUSION
Complete abrogation of the common law rule seems the only course open.
Any attempt merely to modify the rule fails in that it must accept the basic
premises of the common law argument-the premises of guarantee and
coercion. These reasons for the rule have long since ceased to exist. Today,
witnesses are not the property of either party. They are necessary to the liti-
gation. They are really the property of the court and the issues involved,
and no rule should assign them to one party or the other.
The courts have long shown their dislike for the rule.91 Its history in
New York has been a "gradual process of legislative and judicial distinction
88See supra, p. 380.89Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witwss-New Developments (1936) 4 U. OF
Cr. L. REv. 69, 82, 83.90Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (1936) 4 U. oF
CHi. L. REv. 69, 96: "Excessive use of [a complete right of] impeachment would be
checkmated by its own dangers. . . .The ostensible impropriety of a party in calling
a witness and impeaching him if he testified against him, would naturally cause attorneys
to be hesitant in using this method of impeachment. If counsel abused the privilege of
using character testimony, he would pay the price with the jury, who might resent too
much of such procedure."91See supra, note 4.
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and qualification which is a characteristic of the existence of an unwise rule of
law." 19 2 The time has come for the New York legislature to do what its
predecessor of 1849 feared to do. Rip down the common law prohibition,
and set up in its place a rule allowing complete impeachment of one's own
witness-a rule of reason, reality, and justice.
Samuel M. Schatz*
92Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments (1936) 4 U. oF
Cm. L. REv. 69, 96.
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Arthur John Keeffe,
Cornell Law School, under whose supervision and guidance this article was written.
